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Chesnut: Criminal Law

CRIMINAL LAW

UNITED STATES v. ALVARADO:
REFLECTIONS ON A JEWELL
I. INTRODUCTION
In United States v. Alvarado,! the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed
that the use of a Jewell 2 instruction on conscious ignorance is
properly given only when the defendant claims a lack of guilty
knowledge and the proof at trial supports an inference of deliberate ignorance. 3 The Ninth Circuit found that the district court
erred by giving the instruction because the facts tended to establish actual knowledge by the defendants.· Nonetheless, the
convictions were affirmed because the court held that the error
was harmless. II
While disapproving use of the Jewell instruction in Alvarado,S the Ninth Circuit renewed its approval of the instruction
1. 838 F.2d 311 (9th Cir.) (per Anderson, J.; the other panel members were Wiggins,
J., and Canby, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 2880
(1988).
2. The designation derives from United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697 (9th Cir.) (en
bane) (the statutory requirement of "knowingly" is satisfied if the defendant is aware
that the fact in question is highly probable, but he consciously avoids learning the truth),
cert. denied, 426 U.S. 951 (1976). The argument that such an instruction relieves the
jury from finding knowledge by the defendant was rejected in United States v. OlivaresVega, 495 F.2d 827, 830 (2nd Cir. 1974) (jury properly charged that, if, in order to assert
ignorance, the defendant deliberately chose not to learn the fact in question, the jury
could find full equivalent of knowledge).
3. Alvarado, 838 F.2d at 314.
4.Id.
5. Id. at 317. The court also considered defendants' assertions that the prosecutor
made false representations that warranted a new trial. The court found that since the
trial judge acted quickly, emphatically, and appropriately to neutralize the prejudicial
effects of the statements, those statements were harmless error. Id.
6. Alvarado, 838 F.2d at 314.
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and of the underlying concept. 7 That is, to act "knowingly" is
not strictly limited to acting with positive knowledge, but may
also include acting with an awareness of the high probability of
the existence of the fact in question. When such an awareness
exists, "positive" knowledge is not required. 8 Although the Supreme Court has yet to rule on such an instruction,9 Judge (now
Justice) Kennedy, dissenting in Jewell, noted that there is a
problem in viewing wilful blindness as distinct from, but equally
culpable as, "actual" knowledge. 1o
Ninth Circuit cases employing the conscious ignorance instruction have frequently involved incidents of illegal contraband,l1 but the instruction has also been given in criminal prosecutions of a broader range.12 The purpose of the instruction is to
7.Id.
8. Jewell, 532 F.2d at 700. "One with a deliberate anti·social purpose in mind ...
may deliberately 'shut his eyes' to avoid knowing what would otherwise be obvious to
view. In such cases, so far as criminal law is concerned, the person acts at his peril in this
regard, and is treated as having 'knowledge' of the facts as they are ultimately discovered
to be." Id. at 700·01 (quoting R. PERKINS. CRIMINAL LAW 776 (2d ed. 1969».
9. Id. at 701·03. However, the Supreme Court has applied the Model Penal Code
definition of knowledge in determining the meaning of "knowing" in former 21 U.S.C. §
176a. Id. at 701 (citing Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 46 n.93, (1969) (impermissible
to presume that a possessor of marijuana "knows" of its illegal importation). Again, in
Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 416 & n.29, (1970) (those who sell or distribute
heroin are undoubtedly aware of the high probability that the heroin originated in a
foreign country and jury is permitted to infer that heroin possessed here is a smuggled
drug), the Court adopted the Model Penal Code definition of ~'knowingly". The Jewell
court noted that Congress "is presumed to have known and adopted the 'cluster of ideas'
attached to such a familiar term of art". Jewell, 532 F.2d at 703 (citing Morissette v.
United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952) (omission from U.S.C. § 641 of any mention of intent
is not to be construed as eliminating that element from the crimes defined».
10. Jewell, 532 F.2d at 707 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy observed that
Section 2.02(7) of the Model Penal Code is a definition of knowledge, not a substitute for
it. Id. See infra text accompanying notes 104·105.
11. United States v. Pacific Hide & Fur Depot, Inc., 768 F.2d 1096, 1098 (9th Cir.
1985) (violation of Toxic Substances Control Act, §§ 2·30, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2601·2609) (cit·
ing United States v. Lopez·Martinez, 725 F.2d 471, 474·75 (9th Cir.) (importation and
possession of heroin with intent to distribute), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 837 (1984); United
States v. Suttiswad, 696 F.2d 645, 649·52 (9th Cir. 1982) (importation of heroin and
possession with intent to distribute); United States v. Nicholson, 677 F.2d 706, 710·11
(9th Cir. 1982) (conspiracy to possess marijuana with intent to distribute); United States
v. Erwin, 625 F.2d 838, 841 (9th Cir. 1980) (importation of heroin».
12. Pacific Hide, 768 F.2d at 1098 (citing United States v. Henderson, 721 F.2d 276,
277·79 (9th Cir. 1983), (theft of timber belonging to the United States); United States v.
Long, 706 F.2d 1044, 1056 (9th Cir. 1983) (theft of meat from military installation);
United States v. Weiner, 578 F.2d 757, 786·87 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (securities
fraud in the context of false financial statements). cert. denied. 439 U.S. 981 (1978);
United States v. Eaglin, 571 F.2d 1069, 1074·75 (9th Cir. 1977) (concealment of escaped
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prevent individuals from circumventing criminal sanctions
merely by deliberately closing their eyes to an obvious risk of
unlawful conduct. IS This does not create a new crime, but rather
forecloses a potential "loophole" in the law. 14
Because the instruction seems to lend itself particularly to
those cases involving illegal contraband, II! the conscious ignorance doctrine and Jewell instruction have become increasingly
important as the federal government expands the prosecution of
cases involving smuggled drugs. There is evidence that "deliberate avoidance" is an established practice in the illegal drug business. 16 Absent the instruction, individuals who participate in
such ventures could escape liability by the "simple expedient of
not asking questions".17
Despite its importance as a prosecutorial tool, the usefulness of the instruction is impaired by occasional inappropriate
use and confusion generated by disparate forms of the instruction in the federal courts.
II. FACTS
On July 22, 1986, Gustavo Alvarado (Alvarado) and Oscar
Oqueli-Hernandez (Oqueli) arrived at the Los Angeles Airport
on a flight from Brazil. 18 They were accompanied by Oqueli's
federal prisoner), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 906 (1978)).
13. United States v. Sarrantos, 455 F.2d 877, 881 (2nd Cir. 1972) (conspiracy to
make false statements to the Immigration and Naturalization Service). The decision in
Sarrantos predates Jewell, but anticipates the reasoning in Jewell. [d. (citing Leary v.
United States, 395 U.S. 6, 46 n.93 (1969)).
14. Sarrantos, 455 F.2d at 881.
15. Pacific Hide, 768 F.2d at 1098 (citing United States v. Lopez-Martinez, 725 F.2d
471,474-75 (9th Cir.) (importation and possession of heroin with intent to distribute),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 837 (1984); United States v. Suttiswad, 696 F.2d 645, 649-52 (9th
Cir. 1982) (importation and possession of heroin with intent to distribute); United States
v. Nicholson, 677 F.2d 706, 710-11 (9th Cir. 1982) (conspiracy to import and possess
marijuana with intent to distribute)).
16. Nicholson, 677 F.2d at 711.
17. The defendant in Nicholson loaned $20,000 to two individuals who promised
him at least an eight-to-one return on his investment. Although the defendant knew that
the men had been in the marijuana smuggling business, he testified that he did not ask
how his $20,000 was to be used. Several co-conspirators testified that this was a common
practice in the drug business. The testimony was to the effect that one does not ask
questions, because one does not want to know the answer. [d. at 708.
18. United States v. Alvarado, 838 F.2d 311, 312 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct.
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son, Yuri, and Roberto Katan (Katan).19 Oqueli picked up suitcases belonging to Alvarado and Yuri, then, using an expired
diplomatic passport,20 cleared customs without a check. Alvarado picked up a brown suitcase and a black suitcase, both belonging to Oqueli and proceeded to the customs station. 21 The
customs agent noticed that Alvarado's hands trembled as he
handed her the flight ticket and other travel documents. 22
Among the documents was an unused Japan Airlines ticket
dated three days earlier. Alvarado then voluntarily identified
himself as a doctor.2s Because the customs agent found his behavior suspicious, he was directed to the secondary inspection
station for further examination. 2'
When asked to open the black suitcase, Alvarado explained
that Oqueli had the key.26 A customs agent escorted Alvarado to
an exit where a set of keys were produced, not by Oqueli, but by
Katan. 26 In an attempt to open the black suitcase, Alvarado
fumbled and then dropped the keys. Next, he explained that the
keys belonged to the brown suitcase. 27 Alvarado voluntarily
opened the brown suitcase, but it contained only clothing and
dental equipment. 28 Alvarado then told the agent that his friend
had the keys to the black suitcase, but by that time, Oqueli, his
son, and Katan had left the airport and could not be located. 29
With consent from Alvarado, the black suitcase was opened with
a crowbar and Alvarado immediately turned pale. A search of
the contents revealed eleven packages of cocaine. 30
2880 (1988).
19. [d.
20. [d. Oqueli held the position of General Consul for Honduras from January, 1984

to January, 1985. The diplomatic pass had expired with the termination of his post, but
the customs agent was unaware that the pass was invalid. [d.
21. [d. The customs agent noted that Alvarado was well-dressed, yet he was carrying
a red gym-type zipper bag. [d.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d. Oscar Oqueli was standing by an exit with his son and Katan. [d.
[d.

27. [d.
28. [d.
29. [d. When Alvarado was asked why he didn't get the keys to the black suitcase
the first time, he stated that he had forgotten to ask for them. [d.
30. [d. Although Alvarado agreed to open the black suitcase with a crowbar, he explained that the suitcase was not his and stated that he was not responsible for its contents. [d.
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Following his arrest, and through an interpreter, Alvarado
told a representative of the Drug Enforcement Agency that
Oqueli owned the black suitcase and that Alvarado did not know
about the cocaine. 31 The interpreter subsequently testified that
Alvarado told him that Oqueli offered Alvarado a $5000 gift if
Alvarado would carry his suitcase. 32 Alvarado's testimony at trial
denied any discussion of payment for carrying the suitcase. 33
Cooperating with DEA agents, Alvarado placed telephone
calls a4 to Oqueli which eventually led to a meeting at the airport
where Oqueli and Katan were arrested. 311 Following his arrest,
Oqueli stated that the black suitcase belonged to him, that he
had lent it to Alvarado in Rio de Janeiro, and that he was unaware of the cocaine in the suitcase. 36
Alv~rado and Oqueli were tried together for importing, conspiring to import, and possessing with intent to distribute 12.7
kilograms of cocaine. 37 After two days of deliberation, the jury
requested the court to clarify the meaning of the statute. Specifically, the jury asked about the relationship between the words
"know" and "iI'l:tent" and the word "cocaine".38 The judge re31. Id.
32. Id. at 313. The $5000 was to be paid to Alvarado when he returned to the
United States. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. Alvarado first placed a call to Oqueli and left the message that Oqueli should
come to the Marriot Hotel to pick up Alvarado and the suitcases. Id. Some hours later,
Oqueli's sister arrived and without other conversation, asked for change to make a phone
call. Alvarado gave her the change, the call was made, and she left. Id. Alvarado then
made a second call to Oqueli and arranged a meeting at the airport. Id.
35. Id. Oqueli and Katan arrived at the airport in a taxi which passed by Alvarado,
who waved as it passed, but received no acknowledgement. Id. Oqueli then exited the
cab a short distance from Alvarado, motioning for Alvarado to remain there while Oqueli
walked to a phone booth and placed a call. Id. A telephone in the telephone bank near
Alvarado began to ring, but Alvarado ignored it. Id. Oqueli hung up the phone and
walked quickly toward Alvarado, picked up both suitcases, and walked away hurriedly.
Id. He resisted attempts by DEA agents to stop him. Id.
36. Id. In addition, he stated that he was, among other things, in the import-export
business in the United States. Id.
37. Id. Defendants were indicted with the commission of three felony offenses.
Count I alleged the crime of conspiracy to import a controlled substance (21 U.S.C., §§
963, 952(a)(1). Count II alleged the crime of importing 12.7 kilograms of cocaine from
Brazil into the United States (21 U.S.C., §§ 952(a), 960 (a)(l». Count III alleged the
crime of possession with intent to distribute 12.7 kilograms of cocaine (21 U.S.C., §
841(a)(1». Brief for Appellant at 2, United States u. Oqueli-Hernandez, 838 F.2d 311
(9th Cir. 1988) (No. 85-5280).
38.Id.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1989

5

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 [1989], Art. 7

52

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 19:47

read his instructions on "knowledge" and "intent" and then
gave a Jewell instruction. 39 Objection by both defense counsel
was denied. After deliberating another thirty minutes, the jury
returned a verdict against both defendants on all three counts in
the indictment. '0
Defense counsel moved for a new trial on grounds, inter
alia, that there was no evidence to justify a Jewell instruction,
and that the Jewell instruction, as given, was deficient.H
III. BACKGROUND
A.

DEVELOPMENT

The instruction for conscious avoidance of the truth
originated in the 1976 Ninth Circuit case of United States v.
Jewell.'2 In Jewell, the defendant accepted $100 from an individual to drive a car across the border from Mexico after previ39. [d. at 313-14. The instruction given was as follows:

Now, the instruction which I originally refused but I'm
going to give you now is this: The element of knowledge. It's
Devitt and Blackmar's Volume 1, Section 14.09.
The element of knowledge may be satisfied by inferences
drawn from proof that a defendant deliberately-notice I say
"deliberately"-closed his eyes to what would otherwise have
been obvious to him. A finding beyond a reasonable doubt of a
conscious purpose to avoid enlightenment would permit an inference of knowledge.
Stated another way: A defendant's knowledge of a fact
may be inferred from willful blindness to the existence of a
fact. It's entirely up to you as to whether you find any deliberate closing of the eyes and the inference to be drawn from any
such evidence. A showing of negligence or mistake alone is not
sufficient to show a finding of willfulness or knowledge.
If you find a defendant who you are considering believed what
was in the boxes was not a controlled substance, then you
must acquit.
Id. at 314.
40. [d.
41. [d. See supra note 39. Because the court found that the Jewell instruction was

given in error, the issue of the sufficiency of the instruction was not considered. [d. at
317. See also infra text accompanying note 172.
42. 532 F.2d 697 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 951 (1976). The court in
United States v. Caminos, 770 F.2d 361 (3rd Cir. 1985) (knowingly importing and possessing cocaine with intent to distribute) traced the origins of the instruction to the Jewell decision, but (perhaps due to editing errors?) the Fifth Circuit is given credit. [d. at
365.
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ously declining an offer to buy marijuana from him.43 When a
search of the automobile revealed 110 pounds of marijuana, the
defendant claimed he did not know the marijuana was in the
car." The Ninth Circuit approved a jury instruction which allowed satisfaction of the statutory requirement of knowledge if
the defendant's ignorance was solely and entirely the result of
his conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth.411
The legal premise underlying the Jewell instruction has its
roots in English law. 46 Although relatively new to U.S. courts,47
the instruction has achieved firm support among American commentators.48 Those authorities have long recognized that the
statutory requirement of actual knowledge has one strictly limited exception: A person is deemed to have knowledge if his suspicion is aroused, but deliberately avoids knowing the truth in
order to remain ignorant. 49 The concept has been adopted under
such various labels as wilful blindness,lIo conscious avoidance,lIl
43. Jewell, 532 F.2d at 699 n.!.
44. [d. at 698-99 nn. I & 2.
45. [d. at 699-70. The court instructed the jury that "knowingly" meant voluntarily
and intentionally and not by accident or mistake. The court then told the jury that the
government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant "knowingly"
brought the marijuana into the United States and "knowingly" possessed the marijuana.
[d. The court continued:
The Government can complete their burden of proof by
proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that if the defendant was
not actually aware that there was marijuana in the vehicle he
was driving when he entered the United States his ignorance
in that regard was solely and entirely a result of his having
made a conscious purpose to disregard the nature of that
which was in the vehicle, with a conscious purpose to avoid
learning the truth.
[d.
46. [d. The English courts have described it as "connivance", "constructive knowledge", or "knowledge of the second degree". Edwards, The Criminal Degrees of Knowledge, 17 MODERN L. REv. 294, 298 (1954). "A classic illustration of this doctrine is the
connivance of an innkeeper who deliberately arranges not to go into his back room and
thus avoids visual confirmation of the gambling he believes is taking place." Jewell, 532
F.2d at 705 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Bosley v. Davies, (1875) L.R. 1 Q.B. 84).
47. Jewell, 532 F.2d at 705 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Judge Kennedy observed that
the majority opinion justifies the conscious purpose instruction as an application of the
wilful blindness doctrine recognized primarily by English authorities. [d.
48. Jewell, 532 F.2d at 700.
49. [d. (quoting G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART, § 57 at 157 (2nd
ed. 1961) (hereinafter WILLIAMS).
50. United States v. Littlefield, 840 F.2d 143, 147 (1st Cir.) (scheme to defraud the
United States by filing false claims for unemployment benefits), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct.
155 (1988); United States v. Arbizo, 833 F.2d 244, 248 (10th Cir. 1987) (possession of
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deliberate ignorance,1I2 and connivance. 1I3
Judge Browning, writing the opinion of the court in Jewell,
refered to the history of the concept and offered as substantive
justification the rationale that deliberate ignorance and positive
knowledge are equally culpable. 1I4 Further justification was
found in the common understanding that one may "know" that
of which he has less than absolute understanding. 1I11
marijuana with intent to distribute, interstate travel in aid of racketeering, and aiding
and abetting); United States v. Kaplan, 832 F.2d 676, 682 (1st Cir. 1987) (mail fraud),
cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 1080 (1988); United States v. Krowen, 809 F.2d 144, 148 (1st Cir.
1987) (scheme to defraud insurance companies); Caminos, 770 F.2d at 366 (3rd Cir.
1985); United States v. Pacific Hide & Fur Depot, Inc., 768 F.2d 1096, 1097 (9th Cir.
1985).
51. United States v. Gatzonis, 805 F.2d 72, 73 (2nd Cir. 1986) (possession of heroin
with intent to distribute), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 303 (1987); United States v. Picciandra,
788 F.2d 39, 46 (lst Cir.) (income tax evasion), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 847 (1986); United
States v. Aleman, 728 F.2d 492, 493-94 (11th Cir. 1985) (importation of cocaine and possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance); United States v. McAllister, 747
F.2d 1273, 1275 (9th Cir. 1984) (transportation of illegal aliens), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
829 (1985); United States v. Garzon, 688 F.2d 607, 609 (9th Cir. 1982) (possession of
cocaine with intent to distribute).
52. Littlefield, 840 F.2d at 147; United States v. Alvarez, 837 F.2d 1024, 1028 (11th
Cir.) (conspiracy to possess, and actual possession of, marijuana and cocaine with intent
to distribute), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 155 (1988); United States v. Kelm, 827 F.2d 1319,
1323-24 (9th Cir. 1987) (willful failure to file federal income tax returns); Pacific Hide,
768 F.2d at 1098, McAllister, 747 F.2d at 1275.
53. Jewell, 532 F.2d at 701. The early English cases demonstrated a preference for
this term because of its broad implications. One such case states:
The word "conniving" is not to be limited to the literal
meaning of wilfully refusing to see, or affecting not to see or
become acquainted with, that which you know or believe is
happening, or about to happen. It must include the case of a
husband acquiescing in, by wilfully abstaining from taking any
steps to prevent, that adulterous intercourse which, from what
passes before his eyes, he cannot but believe or reasonably
suspect is likely to occur."
Edwards, The Criminal Degrees of Knowledge, 17 MOD. L. REV. 294, 298 (1954) (quoting
Gipps v. Gipps and Hume, 11 H.S.C. 1 (1864».
54. Jewell, 532 F.2d at 700.
55. [d. The court continued saying that to act "knowingly", therefore, is not necessarily to act only with positive knowledge, but also to act with an awareness of the high
probability of the existence of the fact in question. When such awareness is present,
"positive" knowledge is not required. [d.
However, the court emphasized that the required state of mind differs from positive
knowledge only so far as necessary to encompass a deliberate effort to avoid the sanctions of a statute while violating its substance. [d. at 704. "A court can properly find
wilful blindness only where it can almost be said that the defendant actually knew." [d.
(quoting from WILLIAMS, supra note 49, § 57 at 159).
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The Ninth Circuit's recognition of a form of knowledge
other than actual knowledge was not noveP6 Rather, the court's
decision in Jewell was notable for its articulation of the circumstances under which a conscious purpose to avoid discovering
the truth could be equated with knowledge. 07 In a footnote review of the application of such an instruction by courts in other
circuits, the Jewell opinion documented a variety of results and
some inherent confusion. 1I8 Anticipating such difficulties, the
Ninth Circuit offered guidance for jury instructions with section
2.02(7) of the Model Penal Code in mind. 1I9 The Supreme Court
has given at least tacit approval to the definition of knowledge
in that section,60 and recent federal appellate decisions have in56. Jewell, 532 F.2d at 700.
57. United States v. Valle-Valdez, 554 F.2d 911, 913 (9th Cir. 1977) (possession of
marijuana with intent to distribute).
58. Jewell, 532 F.2d at 702 n.12. Among the problems noted by the court were omissions in the instructions, United States v. Squires, 440 F.2d 859. 864 & n. 12 (2nd Cir.
1971) (knowingly making false statement in connection with acquisition of a firearm;
Model Penal Code followed and jury instruction rejected because it should have included
"deliberate ignorance"); United States v. Llanes, 374 F.2d 712, 716 (2nd Cir.) (receiving,
concealing and facilitating the transportation of illegally imported heroin; instructions
properly refused since they failed to include the element of "a conscious purpose to
avoid learning the" [fact in question]), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 917 (1967); Griego v.
United States, 298 F.2d 845, 849 (10th Cir. 1962) (concealment and sale of unlawfully
imported drugs; conviction reversed because jury should have been given deliberate ignorance instruction); United States v. Bright, 517 F.2d 584, 586-88 (2nd Cir. 1975) (possession of stolen mail; conviction reversed because trial court refused to add to a deliberate
ignorance instruction the qualification "unless he actually believes it did not exist").
Jewell, 532 F.2d at 702 n.12. Professor Glanville Williams alluded to the difficulties inherent in the doctrine when he wrote, "The rule that wilful blindness is equivalent to
knowledge is essential, and is found throughout the criminal law. It is, at the same time,
an unstable rule, because judges are apt to forget its very limited scope." [d. at 700
(quoting WILLIAMS. supra note 49, § 57 at 159).
59. [d. at 704. The court said:
We do not suggest that the instruction give'"n in this case
was a model in all respects. The jury should have been instructed more directly (1) that the required knowledge is established if the accused is aware of a high probability of the
existence of the fact in question, (2) unless he actually believes
it does not exist.
[d. n.21. Section 2.02(7) of the Model Penal Code states:
"When knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense, such
knowledge is established if a person is aware of a high probability of its existence, unless
he actually believes that it does not exist." MODEL PENAL CODE 27 (Prop. Official Draft
1962). The court observed that the negation "unless he actually believes that it does not
exist" was not raised as an issue at the trial level in Jewell, speculating that perhaps the
evidence to support it was lacking. Jewell, 532 F.2d at 702 n.12.
60. See supra note 9.
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dicated a general acceptance. S1
Embracing the doctrine in Jewell, the Courts of Appeals in
all of the circuits have either expressed acceptance of the doctrine or adopted some form of deliberate ignorance instruction. s2
As early as 1962, the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Griego S8
held that the tendered defense of no knowledge is not available
if the jury finds from all the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant had a conscious purpose to avoid learning
the fact in question. s• In the 1970 case of United States v.
Abrams,slI the Second Circuit employed the concept of conscious
ignorance. ss The Jewell court noted that such instructions were
also approved in the Sixth and Seventh Circuits. s7 Further,
Courts of Appeals in other circuits had approved the premise
that "knowingly" in criminal statutes is not limited to positive
61. See United States v. Feroz, 848 F.2d 359, 360 (2nd Cir. 1988) (importation and
possession with intent to distribute heroin); United States v. Arbizo, 833 F.2d 244, 249
(10th Cir. 1987) (possession of marijuana with intent to distribute); United States v.
Lanza, 790 F.2d 1015, 1021 (2nd Cir.) (conspiracy to commit wire fraud), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 861 (1986); Caminos, 770 F.2d at 365-66.
62. Jewell, 532 F.2d at 702. See also infra notes 63-75 and accompanying text.
63. 298 F.2d 845 (10th Cir. 1962) (receipt, concealment and sale of unlawfully imported drugs).
64. [d. at 849.
65. 427 F.2d 86 (2nd Cir.) (false statements to the Immigration and Naturalization
Service, endeavoring to influence a witness, and causing an alien to fail to carry and have
in possession a certificate of alien registration), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 832 (1970).
66. [d. at 91. The court found sufficient evidence from which the jury could have
found that the appellant acted with "reckless disregard of whether the statements were
true and with a conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth". [d. (emphasis added). At
the time Jewell was decided the Second Circuit already had substantial case law in support of the doctrine. Jewell, 523 F.2d at 702 n.12. See generally United States v. Dozier,
522 F.2d 224 (2nd Cir.) (aiding and abetting the possession of cocaine with intent to
distribute), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1021 (1975); United States v. Bright, 517 F.2d 584 (2nd
Cir. 1975); United States v. Olivares-Vega, 495 F.2d 827 (2nd Cir.) (importation of cocaine and possession with intent to distribute), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1020 (1974);
United States v. Joly, 493 F.2d 672 (2nd Cir. 1974) (importation and illegal production of
cocaine); United States v. Jacobs, 475 F.2d 270 (2nd Cir.) (crimes relating to dealing in
stolen United States Treasury bills), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973); United States v.
Sarrantos, 455 F.2d 877 (2nd Cir. 1972); Squires, 440 F.2d at 859.
67. Jewell, 532 F.2d at 702. See United States v. Thomas, 484 F.2d 909, 912-13 (6th
Cir.) (making false statements to licensed firearm dealer to purchase handgun and receipt and possession of a gun by one dishonorably discharged from the Army), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 912 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 924 (1974); United States v. Joyce, 499
F.2d 9, 23 (7th Cir.) (mail fraud), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1031 (1974); United States v.
Grizaffi, 471 F.2d 69, 75 (7th Cir. 1972) (conspiracy to misapply federally insured savings
and loan funds, concealment of material facts and false statements to the government,
mail fraud), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 964 (1973).
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knowledge, but includes the state of mind of one who lacks
knowledge soley due to deliberate ignorance. ss Since the Jewell
decision, conscious ignorance instructions have been approved in
the First,SS Third,70 Fourth,71 Fifth,72 Eighth,73 Tenth,74 and
Eleventh7l! Circuits.
68. Jewell, 532 F.2d at 702 and n.13. See Abrams, 427 F.2d at 91; United States v.
Cooperative Grain & Supply Co., 476 F.2d 47, 59 (8th Cir. 1973) (violations of the False
Claims Act).
69. See United States v. Littlefield, 840 F.2d 143, 147-48 (1st Cir.) (wilful blindness
instruction established as law, but instruction given in error), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 155
(1988); United States v. Krowen, 809 F.2d 144, 148-49 (1st Cir. 1987) (wilful blindness
instruction affirmed); United States v. Kaplan, 832 F.2d 676, 682-83 (1st Cir. 1987) (instruction equating wilful blindness with knowledge approved); United States v. Picciandra, 788 F.2d 39, 46 (1st. Cir.) (testimony at trial justified conscious avoidance instruction), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 847 (1986); United States v. Cincotta, 689 F.2d 238, 243-44
(1st Cir.) (false claims against the United States in a conspiracy to defraud; approval of
conscious avoidance charge and approval of doctrine), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 991 (1982).
70. See United States v. Caminos, 770 F.2d 361, 365-66 (3rd Cir. 1985) (deliberate
ignorance instruction affirmed as proper interpretation of law).
71. See United States v. Cogdell, 844 F.2d 179, 181 (4th Cir. 1985) (deliberate ignorance instruction affirmed as proper interpretation of law).
72. See United States v. de Luna, 815 F.2d 301 (5th Cir. 1987) (possession of marijuana with intent to distribute; conscious ignorance instruction affirmed); United States
v. Batencort, 592 F.2d 916, 917-18 (5th Cir. 1979) (importation of a controlled substance
with intent to distribute; deliberate ignorance recognized as equivalent of knowledge);
United States v. Restrepo-Granda, 575 F.2d 524, 528-29 (5th Cir.) (unlawful importation
of cocaine, possession with intent to distribute cocaine, unlawful use of a passport and
visa issued to another person; deliberate ignorance instruction approved), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 935 (1978).
73. See United States v. White, 794 F.2d 367,371 (8th Cir. 1986) (conspiracy to steal
and possess stolen mail; instruction upheld in principle, but given in error).
74. See United States v. Markopoulos, 848 F.2d 1036 (10th Cir. 1988) (conspiracy to
distribute marijuana; instruction on deliberate closing of eyes given in error, but did not
require reversa!); United States v. Arbizo, 833 F.2d 244, 248-50 (10th Cir. 1987) (possession of marijuana with intent to distribute; instruction on wilful blindness affirmed);
United States v. Glick, 710 F.2d 639 (10th Cir. 1983) (mail fraud; deliberate ignorance
instruction affirmed), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1005 (1984).
75. See United States v. Alvarez, 837 F.2d 1024, 1028 (11th Cir.) (conspiracy to possess, and possession of marijuana and cocaine with intent to distribute; deliberate ignorance instruction affirmed), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 2003 (1988); United States v. Orr, 825
F.2d 1537, 1541-42 (11th Cir. 1987) (conspiracy to violate and substantive violations of
the Dyer Act; deliberate ignorance instruction properly given); United States v. Peddle,
821 F.2d 1521, 1524-25 (11th Cir. 1987) (conspiracy to import and possess cocaine with
intent to distribute, importation and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute; conscious avoidance instruction properly given); United States v. Aleman, 728 F.2d 492, 49394 (11th Cir. 1984) (importation of cocaine and possession with intent to distribute a
controlled substance; instruction on conscious avoidance affirmed).
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ApPROPRIATE CONTEXT

Judge Kennedy, dissenting in part in United States v. Murrieta-Bejarano,76 urged that the instruction is appropriate only
when the evidence supports a finding, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the defendant purposely contrived to avoid learning
the truth. 77 In United States v. Suttiswad,78 the Ninth Circuit
found that such evidence was shown. The defendant in Suttiswad arrived in the United States on a flight from Tokyo and was
one of the last passengers to retrieve his luggage. 79 Following
questioning by customs Agents,80 a search was made of defendant's person and luggage. 81 When the linings of the suitcase were
removed, eight packages of heroin (valued at $5,000,000) were
discovered. 82 Following his arrest, the defendant denied all
knowledge of the heroin. 8s He told the customs agent that an
American, "Mr. Tom",84 gave him the suitcase811 and was to have
met him at the Los Angeles Airport. 86 No identifiable finger76. 552 F.2d 1323 (9th Cir. 1977) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 1326. To permit the instruction when the facts do not support such an
inference of conscious avoidance "is to permit it in any number of smuggling cases." Id.
The danger is that juries will disregard the element of scienter and convict under standards analogous to negligence. Id. See infra note 106 and accompanying text.
78. 696 F.2d 645 (9th Cir. 1982).
79. Id. at 646.
80. After looking at the Customs agent several times, the defendant claimed a suitcase and carried it to Customs, where it was briefly inspected and returned. Id. In response to questioning by the agent, defendant stated that he was in the hotel business,
specifically "most like a clerk". Id. His passport listed his profession as "Merchant". Id.
81. Id. The search of the defendant revealed $1,500.00 in traveler's checks, a passport, an airliine ticket and some cash.
82. The suitcase was thoroughly searched after one of the agents noticed that its lid
"seemed rather heavy for an empty suitcase." Id.
83. The defendant stated that he had been hired in Bangkok to act as taxi driver for
an American, by the name of Mr. Tom. Id. Subsequently, the two became friends and
Tom had asked the defendant if he would like to go to the United States. The defendant
(Mr. Suttiswad) said he was poor and unable to travel to the United States. Id. Tom said
he would buy him a ticket, and give him new clothing, cash, and a suitcase. Mr. Suttiswad agreed and the arrangements were made. Id.
84. The defendant was unable to identify the American, recalling only that that he
was a forty-year-old white male with blondish hair and rather skinny. Suttiswad, 696
F.2d at 647.
85. Id. Mr. Suttiswad said that Mr. Tom gave him ten thousand baht (Thai currency) to be used for travel arrangements and to pay for a passport. Id. Suttiswad also
said that later the American gave him cash to purchase the ticket and an additional
amount for spending cash. Id. The suitcase carried by the defendant was perfumed and
exceptionally heavy. Id. at 651 and n.5.
86. Id. at 647. Although defendant had missed a plane connection in Tokyo and
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prints were found on the plastic bags containing the heroin and
the defendant presented no evidence at trial. 87
In United States v. Feroz,88 the Second Circuit affirmed the
instruction when the facts at trial presented a pattern similar to
those in Suttiswad. In Feroz, the defendant arrived in the
United States on a flight from London. 89 He was carrying an attache case concealing 971.56 grams of heroin in a secret compartment.90 Feroz testified that a man named Mirahmad, whom
he had met in Afghanistan, had offered to help him immigrate
from India to the United States. 91 Two hours before Feroz was
to fly from Delhi to London, Mirahmad presented the defendant
with a false passport, a plane ticket and the attache case, which
appeared to be empty.92 At trial, Feroz claimed no knowledge of
the heroin in the attache case. 93
Ninth Circuit cases decided after Jewell have consistently
held that a Jewell instruction is properly given to a jury only
when the defendant claims a lack of guilty knowledge and the
proof at trial supports an inference of deliberate ignorance. 94
been delayed overnight, the defendant told the customs agent that Tom "would ...
know". [d. Defendant later indicated that he was supposed to contact Mr. Tom at the
Cloud Motel in Los Angeles. [d. A telephone number for the Cloud Motel was listed in
an address book carried by the defendant. [d. At the time of his arrest, defendant had in
his possession a letter from a tour company in Bangkok addressed to a tour company in
California advising them that Suttiswad would be joining an in-progress tour. [d. Suttiswad did not volunteer this information to the customs agent, and the California tour
director was unaware of any information regarding the defendant. [d.
87. [d. The court found that if the "Mr. Tom" story was true, the circumstances
surrounding his trip to the United States sufficiently pointed to deliberate ignorance and
therefore justified the instruction. [d. at 651. See also infra note 167 and accompanying
text.
88. 848 F.2d 359 (9th Cir. 1988).
89. [d. at 359.
90. [d. Feroz was arrested and charged with "knowingly and intentionally" importing heroin with "knowingly and intentionally" possessing with intent to distribute. [d.
The defendant was carrying a passport in the name of Mirahmad Feroz, but stated that
his real name was Mohammed Ishaq Feroz. [d.
91. [d.
92. [d.

93. [d.
94. United States v. Pacific Hide & Fur Depot, Inc., 768 F.2d 1096, 1098 (9th Cir.
1985) (citing United States v. McAllister, 747 F.2d 1273, 1275 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 829 (1985); United States v. Henderson, 721 F.2d 276, 277 (9th Cir. 1983)
(theft of federally owned timber); United States v. Garzon, 688 F.2d 607, 609 (9th Cir.
1982); United States v. Murrieta-Bejarano, 552 F.2d 1323, 1325 (9th Cir. 1977». See also
United States v. Erwin, 625 F.2d 838, 841 (9th Cir. 1980) (illegal importation of heroin).
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The cases in which the facts justify such an inference are rare. 911
Therefore, the instruction should rarely be given. 98 Nevertheless,
in the Ninth Circuit, with some frequency, the instruction has
been given in situations where the facts do not support an inference of conscious ignorance, as in Alvarado. 9 ? On occasion, this
problem has arisen in other circuits. 98
Federal Courts of Appeal have allowed the instruction when
there is some evidence of both actual knowledge and conscious
avoidance99 and have tended to find harmless error when the evidence leans heavily toward actual knowledge. loo The instruction
95. McAllister, 747 F.2d at 1275 (citing United States v. Murrieta-Bejarano, 552
F.2d 1323, 1325 (9th Cir. 1977».
96. Murrieta, 552 F.2d at 1325.
97. 838 F.2d 311 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 2880 (1988). See infra notes 144152 and accompanying text. See also United States v. Keirn, 827 F.2d 1319, 1323-24 (9th
Cir. 1987) (conscious avoidance instruction improperly given, but error was harmless);
Pacific Hide, 768 F.2d at 1097-99 (insufficient evidence of wilful blindness); United
States v. Beckett, 724 F.2d 855, 856 (9th Cir. 1984) (no evidence that defendant tried to
close his eyes or ears); United States v. Garzon, 688 F.2d 607, 608-09 (9th Cir. 1982)
(evidence that defendant's conduct was inconsistent with conscious avoidance).
98. See United States v. Littlefield, 840 F.2d 143, 147-50 (1st Cir.) (insufficient evidence of a conscious course of deliberate ignorance but harmless error), cert. denied, 109
S.Ct. 155 (1988); United States v. Markopoulos, 848 F.2d 1036, 1039-40 (10th Cir. 1988)
(deliberate ignorance instructions given were harmless error); United States v. White,
794 F.2d 367, 371 (8th Cir. 1986) (facts did not support giving of conscious avoidance
instruction but error harmless).
99. See United States v. Cogdell, 844 F.2d 179, 181 (4th Cir. 1988) (evidence of actual knowledge and that defendant deliberately closed her eyes to the truth); United
States v. Arbizo, 833 F.2d 244, 248-49 (10th Cir. 1987) (evidence supporting both actual
knowledge and deliberate avoidance of knowledge); United States v. de Luna, 815 F.2d
301, 302 (5th Cir. 1987) (evidence of actual knowledge and deliberate avoidance of
knowledge by defendant); United States v. Krowen, 809 F.2d 144, 148-50 (1st Cir. 1987)
(evidence of high probability of actual knowledge by defendant and that defendant willfully chose to blind himself to facts); United States v. Ramsey, 785 F.2d 184, 188-191
(7th Cir.) (evidence of actual knowledge and defendants' portrayal of themselves as "gullible" combined to make instruction appropriate), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1186 (1986);
United States v. Cincotta, 689 F.2d 238, 243-44 (1st Cir.) (evidence of actual knowledge
and sufficient evidence that defendant chose not to know the fact in question), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 991 (1982); United States v. Eaglin, 571 F.2d 1069, 1074-75 (9th Cir.
1977) (evidence of actual knowledge and that defendant was "aware of a high probability
of the fact in question"), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 906 (1978).
100. See Littlefield, 840 F.2d at 147 (defendant did not claim ignorance of the illegal activity and facts did not suggest a course of deliberate ignorance, but willful blindness instruction was harmless error); United States v. Keirn, 827 F.2d 1319, 1323-24 (9th
Cir. 1987) (facts tended to show actual knowledge rather than deliberate ignorance so
instruction inappropriate, but "logically harmless" to defendant); United States v. Holland, 831 F.2d 717, 722-23 (7th Cir. 1987) (the inherently suspicious nature of the illegal
activity suggested actual awareness by defendants, so "ostrich" instruction was error, but
harmless); United States v. White, 794 F.2d 367, 371 (8th Cir. 1986) (overwhelming evi-
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has been disallowed when there is insufficient evidence of conscious avoidance. lol

C.

SEMANTICS AND FORM

The dissent in Jewell noted that one flaw in the wilful
blindness doctrine is its bias toward visual verification of facts to
determine actual knowledge. l02 Knowledge may be acquired
through multiple combinations of senses and mental deductions
and remain validly "actual".103 Judge Kennedy further cited the
more important legal problem posed by viewing wilful blindness
as a state of mind distinct from "actual" knowledge. l04 That is,
when a statute specifically requires knowledge as an element of a
crime, the substitution of some other state of mind cannot be
justified even if the court deems that both are equally
blameworthy. lOll
Finally, Judge Kennedy observed that there is difficulty in
maintaining a clear distinction between behavior that consti.tutes conscious ignorance and that which is merely "reckless"
and thus implies negligence. l06 The Second Circuit has been
troubled by such semantics in the past,107 and the same words
dence of direct participation by defendant in illegal activities so instruction given in error, but error harmless).
101. See United States v. Pacific Hide & Fur Depot, Inc., 768 F.2d 1096 (9th Cir.
1985) (insufficient evidence of willful blindness to warrant a Jewell instruction); United
States v. Beckett, 724 F.2d 855, 856 (9th Cir. 1984) (insufficient evidence that defendant
tried to close his eyes or ears to what was happening); United States v. Garzon, 688 F.2d
607,609 (9th Cir. 1982) (insufficient evidence that defendant contrived to avoid learning
the truth).
102. Jewell, 532 F.2d at 705 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 706 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
105. Id.
106. Id. See also United States v. Murrieta-Bejarano, 552 F.2d 1323, 1325 (9th Cir.
1977) (importation and possession of marijuana with intent to distribute). Judge Kennedy, dissenting in Murrieta, warned that the danger in giving the instruction absent
evidence of conscious ignorance is that juries will avoid questions of scienter and convict
under the standards analogous to negligence. Such convictions are wholly inconsistent
with the statutory requirement of scienter. Id. at 1326 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
107. See United States v. Bright, 517 F.2d 584, 586-89 (2nd Cir. 1975) (conviction
reversed when jury instruction included "reckless disregard" and conscious effort to
avoid learning truth, without balancing instruction). See also, United States v. Jacobs,
475 F.2d 270, 287-288 (2nd Cir. 1973) (approval of jury instruction containing "reckless
disregard" and conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth); United States v. Sarrantos, 475 F.2d 877, 880-82 (2nd Cir. 1972) ("reckless disregard" of the falsity of state-
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have found their way to the Sixth Circuit. lOS The distinction between terms such as and "reckless disregard" and "negligence"
borders on nuance. lOS It follows that a jury would be confused
when the use of such language is employed in connection with
the instruction. 11 0 Recognizing this, the Second Circuit in
United States v. Hanlon,lll strongly urged that the term "reckless" be omitted from the instruction.ll2 Adopting this policy,
more recent Second Circuit cases have avoided the term and the
approved instructions resemble the Ninth Circuit model. 11s
In an analysis to determine whether knowledge existed, the
question then follows whether to use an objective, reasonable
person test, or whether the defendant's subjective belief should
be considered dispositive. 1 a In answer, the dissenting opinion in
Jewell noted that a conscious purpose instruction must emphasize that a defendant's subjective belief is the determinative factor.lUI Failure to emphasize this subjective belief may allow a
ments or a conscious effort to avoid learning the truth). The court in Sarrantos, went
one step further by stating "The phrases 'reckless disregard of whether the statements
made were true' and 'conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth' mean essentially the
same thing". See also, United States v. Abrams, 427 F.2d 86, 90-91 (2nd Cir.) (approving
an instruction using "reckless disregard" for the truth) cert. denied, 400 U.S. 832 (1970).
108. United States v. Thomas, 484 F.2d 909, 912-914 (6th Cir.) (instruction included
"reckless disregard" of truth or a conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 912 (1973).
109. United States v. Hanlon, 548 F.2d 1096, 1101 (2nd Cir. 1977) (conspiracy, wire
fraud, making false statements to obtain loans; conscious avoidance charge approved, but
use of "recklessness" disapproved). The court said, "The distinction between recklessness and negligence is elusive enough for even the most respected scholars." [d. at 1101.
110. [d.
111. 548 F.2d 1096, 1100-02 (2nd Cir. 1977).
112. [d. at 1101. The court said, "We are troubled ... by the repeated use of the
term 'reckless' ". [d. There followed a discussion of the confusion generated by the term.
Then the court said, "It adds nothing to the 'conscious avoidance' language which we
have approved, and might tend to mislead the jury." [d. at 1101-02. Finally, while finding that the jury instruction considered on appeal did not constitute error, the court
cautioned that should trial courts continue to employ such language, "we will not hesitate to take appropriate corrective measures". [d.
113. See supra note 59 for the Ninth Circuit model. For examples of recent Second
Circuit cases employing similar instructions, see United States v. Lanza, 790 F.2d 1015,
1020-24 (2nd Cir.) (conspiracy to commit wire fraud), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 861 (1986).
See also, Unit.ed States v. Gatzonis, 805 F.2d 72, 73-74 (2nd Cir. 1986) (possession of
heroin with intent to distribute), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 303 (1987).
114. Jewell, 532 F.2d at 706 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). "Want of knowledge ... may
disprove the existence of a specific intent. Thus one cannot intend to steal property
which he believes to be his own however careless he may have been in coming to that
belief." [d. at 705 n.l (quoting R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 778 (2nd ed. 1969).
115. Jewell, 532 F.2d at 707 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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jury to convict on an objective theory of knowledge, that of a
reasonable person. U6 In spite of a concerted effort to keep the
standard one of a defendant's subjective knowledge, the reasonable person standard has surfaced at least once in connection
with the instruction.ll7
In Jewell, the Ninth Circuit cautiously approved the district
court's instruction as given,118 but recommended the instruction
preferred by the court.U9 Subsequent decisions have insisted on
the dual elements of the recommended instruction. 120 That is,
(l)the defendant must be aware of the high probability of the
fact in question, (2)unless he actually believes it does not exist. 121 That framework remains viable and unique in its com116. [d. Judge Kennedy, dissenting, said:

The second defect in the instruction as given is that it did
not alert the jury that Jewell could not be convicted if he "actually believed" there was no controlled substance in the car.
The failure to emphasize, as does the Model Penal Code, that
subjective belief is the determinative factor, may allow a jury
to convict on an objective theory of knowledge-that a reasonable man should have inspected the car and would have discovered what was hidden inside.
[d.
117. See United States v. Nicholson, 677 F.2d 706, 709-11 (9th Cir. 1982). Defendant had invested $20,000 in a venture that was not disclosed to him. The court said,
"The circumstances surrounding the investment opportunity presented to Nicholson
would have put any reasonable person on notice that there was a 'high probability' that
the undisclosed venture was illegal." [d. at 710.
118. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
119. See supra note 59.
120. See United States v. Valle-Valdez, 554 F.2d 911, 913-14 (9th Cir. 1977). The
court reversed the conviction for possession with intent to distribute marijuana because
the jury instruction failed include that the jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant was aware of a high probability that the vehicle he was driving contained contraband. [d. Valle- Valdez was decided two and one-half years prior to Jewell
and lacked the benefit of the recommended instruction. The district judge relied on a
Tenth Circuit decision in Griego v. United States, 298 F.2d 845, 849 (10th Cir. 1962).
Valle-Valdez, 554 F.2d at 913. The Court found that because Valle-Valdez denied any
knowledge or suspicion that he possessed contraband, a factual question arose regarding
his awareness of the high probability of the presence of contraband. Reasoning that because this factual question should have gone to the jury, the effect of the instruction was
to create the possibility that Valle-Valdez was convicted without possessing the contraband "knowingly" as interpreted in Jewell. [d. at 914. Because the error probably materially affected the verdict, the Ninth Circuit reversed. [d. at 917. See also United States
v. Esquer-Gamez, 550 F.2d 1231, 1234-36 (9th Cir. 1977) (importing, possessing and distributing cocaine). The court reversed, in part, the conviction because the trial court's
instruction failed to include the balancing element "unless he actually believes it does
not exist". [d. at 1235.
121. [d.
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pleteness. The First Circuit only recently provided such guidance. 122 The Second Circuit continues to struggle with variations
on the instruction. In a current attempt to settle the issue and
promote uniformity, the court in United States v. Feroz,12S emphatically stated the preferred language and announced it would
distribute copies of that opinion to the all of the United States
Attorneys and the Assistant United States Attorneys within the
Second Circuit to promote compliance. 124 The Third Circuit has
adopted the language of Jewell. 121i The Fifth Circuit, while citing
Jewell with approval,I26 has been been silent on form, as has the
Fourth Circuit127 and the Sixth Circuit. 128
The Seventh Circuit, adopting the sobriquet "ostrich instruction",129 and with substantial case law in support of the instruction,180 appears to be in the process of refining a preferred
122. See United States v. Picciandra, 788 F.2d 39, 46-47 (1st Cir.) (wilful blindness
instruction approved when (1) the defendant claims a lack of knowledge,(2)the facts suggest a conscious course of deliberate ignorance, and (3)the instruction, taken as a whole,
cannot be understood as mandating an inference of knowledge), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
847 (1986).
123. 848 F.2d 359, 360-61 (2nd. Cir. 1988) (possession of heroin with intent to distribute). The court said:
This court has repeatedly emphasized that, in giving the
conscious avoidance charge, the district judge should instruct
the jury that knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is
established (1) if a person is aware of a high probability of its
existence, (2) unless he actually believes that it does not exist.
[d.
124. [d.
125. See United States v. Caminos, 770 F.2d 361, 365-66 (3rd Cir. 1985).

126. United States v. Restrepo-Granda, 575 F.2d 524, 527-29 (5th Cir.) (importation
and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 935 (1978).
The court acknowledged that the instruction given did not include balancing language
(the second half of the dual element of Jewell), but concluded that the charge was not so
deficient as to be plain error. [d. Later, in United States v. Batencort, 592 F.2d 916, 91718 (5th Cir. 1979), that court approved an instruction that did contain the dual elements,
but made no mention of form.
127. See United States v. Cogdell, 844 F.2d 179, 181 (4th Cir. 1988).
128. See United States v. Thomas, 484 F.2d 909, 912-14 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 912 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 924 (1974).
129. United States v. Holland, 831 F.2d 717, 722 (7th Cir. 1987) (aiding and abetting
misapplication of federally insured funds). See also United States v. Ramsey, 785 F.2d
184, 189 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1186 (1986). The court said, "When someone
knows enough to put him on inquiry, he knows much. If a person with a lurking suspicion goes on as before and avoids further knowledge, this may support an inference that
he has deduced the truth and is simply trying to avoid giving the appearance (and incurring the consequences) of knowledge."
130. United States v. Kehm, 799 F.2d 354 (7th Cir. 1896) (conspiracy to smuggle
marijuana and cocaine); United States v. Josefik, 753 F.2d 585 (7th Cir.) (conspiracy to
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version.l31 Despite the urgings of the court, however, no definitive model has emerged. ls2 Nor has a model instruction been
suggested in the Eighth Circuit. 133 The Tenth Circuit has recommended an instruction similar in form to Jewell, but has not
required compliance. IS. And finally, the Eleventh Circuit has approved instructions which vary considerably,m but has offered
no preferred version.
The result of these variations among the federal courts is an
instruction that has achieved less than full utility. While widely
approved, it remains misunderstood and misused with surprising
frequency.
possess and possession of stolen whiskey), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1055 (1985); United
States v. Lynch, 699 F.2d 839 (7th Cir. 1982) (mail fraud and conspiracy to commit racketeering). See also supra note 129.
131. Ramsey, 785 F.2d at 190. The court noted that there is an "undercurrent of
dissatisfaction with the instruction". [d. Finding the standard jury instruction somewhat
opaque, the court noted that however useful the idea of inferring knowledge from studied ignorance may seem to judges, it is an unusual concept for a lay juror. Therefore, it is
important to give them instructions that are reasonably comprehensible. [d. To this end,
the court suggested the following instruction:
You may infer knowledge from a combination of suspicion
and indifference to the truth. If you find that a person had a
strong suspicion that things were not what they seemed or
that someone had withheld some important facts, yet shut his
eyes for fear of what he would learn, you may conclude that he
acted knowingly, as I have used that word.
[d.

132. Kehm, 799 F.2d at 362. Referring to the decision in Ramsey, the court observed, "We have urged district judges to choose better language, but we have also held
that this language is permissible". [d.
133. See United States v. White, 794 F.2d 367, 371 (8th Cir. 1986) (conspiracy to
steal and possess stolen mail, and possession of stolen mail); United States V. Nordstrom,
730 F.2d 556, 557 (8th Cir. 1984) (aiding or assisting escape of a federal prisoner).
134. See United States v. Glick, 710 F.2d 639, 643 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465
U.S. 1005 (1984). The defendant in Glick argued that the version of the instruction given
at trial was inadequate because it failed to require the jury to find that "the defendant
was subjectively aware of a high probability of the existence of the fact whose knowledge
is imputed, and that knowledge of that fact may not be imputed if the defendant actually believed that such fact did not exist". [d. While finding that failure to include such
language did not constitute grounds for reversal, the court did find that inclusion of the
omitted language would have been preferable. [d. at 643-44. Similarly, in United States
V. Arbizo, 833 F.2d 244, 249 (10th Cir. 1987), the court expressed a preference for the
dual elements, but found that failure to include them did not warrant a reversal. [d.
135. See United States V. Alvarez, 837 F.2d 1024, 1028 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 108
S.Ct. 2003 (1988); United States V. Orr, 825 F.2d 1537, 1541 (11th Cir. 1987) (illegal
salvage and sale of automobiles); United States V. Peddle, 821 F.2d 1521, 1524 (11th Cir.
1987) (conspiracy to import and possess cocaine with intent to distribute); United State
v. Aleman, 728 F.2d 492, 493-94 (11th Cir. 1984).
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IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
A.

THE MAJORITY

The primary issue considered in the Alvarado appeal was
the appropriateness of the district court's use of the Jewell instruction. 13s Relying on established guidelines,137 the court reaffirmed that when the evidence points to actual knowledge, or
lack of any knowledge, rather than deliberate avoidance, the giving of a Jewell instruction is inappropriate. 13s The court observed that the standard test remains an awareness by the defendant of a high probability of the existence of the fact in
question coupled with actions indicating that the defendant purposely contrived to avoid learning all of the facts in order to
have a defense in the event of a subsequent prosecution.1 3B
Thus, in order to correctly employ a conscious ignorance instruction, the government must have presented evidence supporting
an inference that Alvarado and Oqueli purposely avoided obtaining actual knowledge that the suitcase contained cocaine. 140
Evidence indicating that they had actual knowledge or lacked
any knowledge of the cocaine would render the instruction
inappropriate. 141
1.

Gustavo Alvarado

The prosecution contended that the evidence presented at
trial "established a plethora of suspicious circumstances"142
tending to show not only conscious avoidance of knowledge, but
also evidence of a conspiracy to import cocaine which "could
only have been unknown to the defendants because of deliberate ignorance"I'3 (emphasis in the original).
136. United States v. Alvarado, 838 F.2d 311, 314-16 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 108
S.Ct. 2880 (1988).
137. [d. at 314 (quoting United States v. Pacific Hide & Fur Depot, Inc., 768 F.2d
1096 (9th Cir. 1985)). "A Jewell instruction is properly given only when [the] defendant
claims a lack of guilty knowledge and the proof at trial supports an inference of deliberate ignorance." [d. at 1098.
138. Alvarado, 838 F.2d at 314.
139. [d.
140. [d.
141. [d.
142. [d. at 315.
143. [d.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol19/iss1/7

20

Chesnut: Criminal Law

CRIMINAL LAW

1989]

67

The Ninth Circuit disagreed and concluded that most, if not
all, the facts supported a finding of actual knowledge. l44 The
prosecution relied, in part, on the evidence that Alvarado retrieved and carried Oqueli's suitcase rather than his own, that
he had appeared nervous and trembling at the customs check,
that he had made inconsistent statements regarding the purpose
of his trip and that he had made inconsistent statements about
the ownership of the black suitcase. 141i The most persuasive ar144. [d. at 314-15.
145. [d. at 315. The prosecution pointed to the following evidence:
1. Alvarado and Oqueli were the last passengers off the plane

and the last to pass through the prescreening and control
points. The prosecution argued at trial that defendants were
hoping that the customs inspectors would be less diligent.
2. Alvarado retrieved and carried from the luggage carousel,
not his luggage, but two suitcases belonging to codefendant
Oqueli.
3. Alvarado appeared nervous and trembling during his contacts with customs officers.
4. Alvarado had two airplane tickets, one of which he used to
fly home on Varig Airlines and was paid for with cash, and a
valid, but unused, Japanese Airline ticket. Alvarado testified
that Oqueli gave him the Varig ticket. Oqueli denied giving
the ticket to Alvarado.
5. Alvarado made inconsistent statements to customs officials
about the purpose of his trip. He told the inspector at
prescreening that he was returning from Rio de Janeiro alone
after a one-week vacation. After his arrest, he told DEA agents
he had been on a ten-day trip to Rio for a medical conference.
At trial, he testified that he went to Rio with Oquelito price
leather for a contemplated import/export business.
6. Alvarado appeared to avoid opening the black suitcase
which contained the cocaine. After he was requested to obtain
the keys to open the black suitcase, he presented keys that fit
the brown suitcase, not the black one. He readily agreed to
open the brown suitcase.
7. Alvarado made inconsistent statements regarding the ownership of the black suitcase. At the secondary search area, he
claimed ownership of both the black and brown suitcases and
presented the appropriate baggage claim tags. He further
stated that he had set the combination on the black when he
purchased it. Later, when he was given a crowbar to force
open the black suitcase, he stated that the suitcase was "Oscar's", not his, and that he was not responsible for its
contents.
8. After forcing open the black suitcase with a crowbar, Alvarado immediately turned pale even though there was no cocaine yet visible.
9. Alvarado allegedly made a post-arrest statement that he
agreed to carry the black suitcase as a favor for a friend and,
upon his return to the United States, his friend would give
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gument advanced by the prosecution was Alvarado's alleged
post-arrest statement that a friend had promised him $5000 as a
gift if he delivered the black suitcase.146 Because of the contradictory nature of this evidence,147 the court concluded that this
argument alone did not justify a Jewell instruction. 1• 8
2. Oscar Oqueli-Hernandez
The Ninth Circuit also concluded that the evidence
presented at trial pointed to actual knowledge by Oqueli rather
than deliberate avoidance. 1.& The prosecution pointed to evidence that Oqueli carried Alvarado's suitcase through customs,
that he had used an invalid diplomatic passport, his abandonment of Alvarado at the airport, and the curious events at the
Marriot Hotel and the airport prior to his arrest.lllO Those facts
him $5,000 as a gift for carrying the suitcase.
Id.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id.
See supra text accompanying nn. 31-33.
Alvarado, 838 F.2d at 315-16.
Id. at 316.
150. Id. The prosecution relied on the following evidence:
1. Oqueli carried, not his, but Alvarado's suitcases through
customs.
2. Oqueli used an invalid diplomatic passport to pass through
customs. Oqueli had been General Consul to the United States
from Honduras for one year, but his diplomatic pass had
expired.
3. Oqueli, along with his son, Yuri, and Katan, apparently
abandoned Alvarado at the airport while Alvarado was being
questioned and searched by customs. This was deemed by the
prosecution to be suspicious because Alvarado and Oqueli
were close friends.
4. Oqueli failed to appear at the Marriott Hotel to retrieve his
suitcases at Alvarado's request. However, Oqueli's sister arrived at the hotel, asked for change, and without engaging him
in any other conversation, left and made a phone call. The
prosecution claimed the sister was sent to conduct countersurveillance on behalf of Oqueli.
5. Oqueli's peculiar method of retrieving his suitcase. Oqueli
arrived at the airport in a taxi. It passed by Alvarado. Alvarado waved. Oqueli did not acknowledge. Oqueli exited the
cab a short distance from Alvarado, motioned for him to remain where he was, then walked to a nearby telephone booth
and made a telephone call. A telephone near Alvarado began
to ring. Alvarado did not answer it. Oqueli hung up and
walked hurriedly toward Alvarado. He picked up the suitcases,
motioned for Alvarado to follow and walked hurriedly away.
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in tandem with the facts relating to Alvarado tended to establish
a "consciousness of guilt".uu The Court found that in light of
the insufficiency of evidence for a trier of fact to reasonably conclude that Oqueli contrived to avoid learning of the cocaine" the
Jewell instruction should not have been given. m
3. Harmless Error
The court then analyzed the erroneous administration of
the instruction against the guidelines of the harmless error doctrine. IIlS As a result of this analysis, the court concluded that the
error did not affect the verdict.1II4 The majority, convinced that
the defendants were traveling together, knew of the cocaine, and
had joined in an attempt to import the cocaine without detecWhen DEA agents attempted to stop Oqueli, he resisted.
6. All of Alvarado's telephone calls attempting to set up a
meeting to return the suitcases emphasized Alvarado's desire
to relinquish the black suitcase to Oqueli. In one telephone
call to Oqueli's son Yuri, Alvarado threatened to throw the
black suitcase away unless Oqueli appeared.
7. Oqueli, in his post-arrest statement, claimed ownership of
the black suitcase, but said "he had loaned it to his friend
before boarding the plane on a return trip". However, at trial
he asserted the suitcase belonged to him and that its entire
contents were his.
[d.

151. [d.
152. [d.
153. Alvarado, 838 F.2d at 317. Applying the reasoning in United States v. Beckett,
724 F.2d 855, 856 (9th Cir. 1984) (narcotics violation) in which that court found that
evidence of overwhelming guilt, compelling a conviction, establishes the appropriateness
of the application of the harmless error rule, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that such evidence was present in Alvarado. Alvarado, 838 F.2d at 317. The court noted the analysis
from United States v. Rea, 532 F.2d 147, 149 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 837 (1976).
In Rea, the defendant was charged with illegally importing and possessing heroin with
intent to distribute. [d. at 148. At trial, and during deliberation, the jury inquired
whether the element of knowledge required a finding that the defendant knew she had
heroin or merely a controlled substance. After the trial judge had repeated his instructions several times, the jury was satisfied that they understood. [d. at 148-49. Following
conviction, the defendant appealed on the grounds of inadequate jury instructions. [d. at
148. The Ninth Circuit acknowledged the imperfect state of the instructions, but held
that an improper instruction will be harmless error where the instruction is "logically
harmless" to the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. [d. at 149.
154. Alvarado, 838 F.2d at 317. The court further noted that it is mandatory to
consider the entire record prior to reversing a conviction for such harmless error. [d.
(citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) (before a constitutional error can
be held harmless, the court must be able to declare its belief that the error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt).
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tion, found that a guilty verdict on all counts was compelled. 11111

B.

CONCURRENCE AND DISSENT

Judge Canby concurred with the majority opinion in all portions relating to defendant Oqueli. Dissenting as to the result for
Defendant Alvarado, he first acknowledged that the Jewell instruction is harmless error if the evidence is so overwhelming
that a conviction is compelled. lIIs He could not agree that the
evidence presented compelled a conviction of Alvarado. 1117
V. CRITIQUE
In view of the acceptance by every circuit of some form of
the conscious ignorance instruction,11l8 the Ninth Circuit's renewed approval of the concept in United States v. Alvarado l1l9 is
certainly well within the mainstream of judicial reasoning. ISO
The finding in Alvarado, that the Jewell instruction was inappropriately given in the presence of facts pointing toward actual
knowledge rather than conscious avoidance, is consistent with
previous Ninth Circuit decisions. lSI Nevertheless, the erroneous
use of the instruction in Alvarado is typical of the difficulties
courts have encountered in determining the context in which it
may be applied. ls2
Cases involving illegal contraband often present very similar
fact patterns, as demonstrated in Alvarado, Suttiswad,ls3 and
Feroz. lS• In all three cases, defendants were apprehended at air155. [d.
156. [d. (Canby, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.)
157. [d. at 317-18. (Canby, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.)

158. United States v. Ramsey, 785 F.2d 184, 189 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S.
1186 (1986). See also supra notes 63-75 and accompanying text.
159. 838 F.2d 311 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2880 (1988).
160. United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 702-03 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied,
426 U.S. 951 (1976). The Jewell court noted that the lines of authority recognizing the
concept of conscious ignorance appeared unbroken. [d. To reach a different result would
put the court in direct conflict with those Courts of Appeals in other circuits that had
approved conscious ignorance instructions. [d.
161. See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 97-98, 100-01.
163. United States v. Suttiswad, 696 F.2d 645 (9th Cir. 1982). See supra text accompanying notes 78 - 87 for discussion of facts.
164. United States v. Feroz, 848 F.2d 359 (9th Cir. 1988). See also supra text ac-
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ports after illegal contraband was discovered in luggage carried
by defendants. All denied knowledge of the presence of the the
contraband. And in each case, the defendant claimed that the
luggage had been given to him by another individual under pretext of friendship. In view of such significant similarities, leading
to different results, it is not surprising that the fine line between
facts tending to show actual knowledge and facts tending to
show deliberate ignorance may be difficult to appreciate.
Under the facts presented in Suttiswad, the Ninth Circuit
found that the Jewell instruction was properly given. 161i Assuming that the "Mr. Tom" story was true/ 66 the circumstances surrounding the defendant's trip to the United States sufficiently
pointed to deliberate ignorance which would justify such an
instruction. 167
The Second Circuit, in Feroz, while considering primarily
the form of the instruction/ 6s affirmed that the conscious avoidance charge is properly used "where a defendant has claimed
lack of some specific aspect of knowledge necessary to conviction
but where the evidence may be construed as deliberate
ignorance. "169
companying notes 88-93 for discussion of facts.
165. [d. at 651.
166. The validity of defendant's claim that he unknowingly acted as a "mule" was
discussed at length during closing arguments. [d. at n.4. The court noted that the jury, in
determining such validity, should consider the defendant's background, the inherent improbability of the "Mr. Tom story", the defendant's actions at the airport before he
claimed his bag, his conflicting stories about where he was to meet "Mr. Tom", the various descriptions he gave of his occupation, the suspicious nature of his possession of the
15-day tour letter which conflicted with his story that he came to visit "Mr. Tom", and
finally, whether or not an knowing "mule" would have been entrusted with heroin valued
at $5,000,000. [d.
167. Suttiswad, 696 F.2d at 651. The court observed that if a relative stranger, of
short acquaintance, gave Suttiswad the airplane ticket, clothing, a substantial amount of
cash, and a suitcase which seemed to be unusually heavy, and if Suttiswad was expected
to travel to the United States to meet "Mr. Tom" without ever knowing his last name,
his address or phone number, the jury could properly infer that defendant deliberately
closed his eyes to what otherwise would have been obvious to him. [d.
168. [d. at 360. The trial judge failed to include in his instruction that knowledge of
the existence of a particular fact is established (1) if a person is aware of a high
probability of its existence, (2) unless he believes that it does not exist. [d. (citing United
States v. Shareef, 714 F.2d 232, 233 (2nd. Cir. 1983)).
169. [d. (citing United States v. Lanza, 790 F.2d 1015, 1022 (2nd. Cir.), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 861 (1986)).
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The task of ascertaining the factual situation appropriate
for application of a Jewell instruction is complicated further
when courts, as in Suttiswad, acknowledge the "inherent improbability"170 of defendant's story and yet find the same circumstances sufficient to show deliberate ignorance.
Inconsistency and confusion over form has presented the
second major difficulty in the application of a conscious ignorance instruction.171 While the form of the instruction given in
Alvarado was not addressed by the court, it is possible to speculate that it would not have passed muster under Jewell and subsequent Ninth Circuit standards.17:1 The requesite dual elements
of "high probability of awareness by defendant" and a negation
by defendants' own belief were lacking. The failure of the trial
court to use the established language is puzzling in light of the
wealth of case law that has emerged since Jewell. As the court in
Ramsey noted, federal courts should be able to do better than
continuously repeat an instruction that is opaque and unhelpful
to jurors. 173 There are goals higher than seeing "not reversible
error" in an appellate opinion. 174 The Ninth Circuit's model instruction, its dual elements suggested in Jewell and patterned
after the Model Penal Code's definition of knowledge, has
proved to be complete and has required no modification. Even
so, as demonstrated in Alvarado, courts within the Ninth Circuit
remain subject to error in form.
Still less consistency has been noted in the circuits where no
standard form of the instruction has been adopted. l7Ii However,
certain patterns have emerged to indicate that there is at least
some consensus as to minimal acceptable form.176 Judge Gurfein,
170. See supra note 166.
171. See supra text accompanying notes 118-35.
172. See supra note 39.
173. Ramsey, 785 F.2d at 190. The court noted that most jurors encounter the "arcane language" of instructions infrequently. [d. Therefore it is important to give them
instructions that do not require scholastic glossators to impart meaning. [d.
174. [d.
175. See supra notes 122-35 and accompanying text.
176. See supra note 103. In United States v. Picciandra, 788 F.2d 39, 46-47 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 847 (1986), the First Circuit adopted the first two requirements of the Ninth Circuit that (1) the defendant must claim a lack of guilty knowledge
and (2) that the facts must suggest a course of deliberate ignorance. The third requirement suggested by that court is that the instructions taken as a whole must not be understood as mandating an inference of knowledge. [d. This universal concept was articu-

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol19/iss1/7

26

Chesnut: Criminal Law

1989]

CRIMINAL LAW

73

writing the opinion of the court for the Second Circuit in United
States v. Bright,177 noted that although some may say, quite
properly, that subtle nuances in a judge's charge fall on deaf
ears, there is no assurance that this is SO.178 The juror's difficult
task of probing the mind and will of the defendant is hard
enough with the aid of an instruction that balances the countervailing considerations. 179 That juror's verdict becomes suspect
when he has not had the benefit of a balanced instruction from
the court.180 While use of the balancing language of Section
2.02(7) of the Model Penal Code has not been universally
adopted, research has failed to produce a single instance where
inclusion of such language has produced an instruction disapproved on the basis of form.
lated by Judge Duniway, writing for the majority in United States v. Murrieta-Bejarano,
552 F.2d 1323, 1324-25 (9th Cir. 1977). Anticipating that, under certain circumstances,
the act of giving the instruction might be to create a presumption of guilt, he wrote,
"Although no evidence indicates a defendant's conscious purpose to avoid learning the
truth, a jury, given the Jewell instruction, might infer that the defendant possessed
"knowledge" when it would not otherwise have done so." Id. at 1325.
177. 517 F.2d 584, 587 (9th Cir. 1975).
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. The court noted Section 2.02(7) of the Model Penal Code and its coupling
of the element of "high probability" with its negation by a defendant's actual belief to
the contrary. Id. See also supra note 59. See also United States v. Caminos, 770 F.2d
361, 365-66 (3rd Cir. 1985) (adopting the language of Jewell). See also supra note 169.
The Fifth Circuit cited the Model Penal Code definition of knowledge with approval in
United States v. Restrepo-Granda, 575 F.2d 524, 528 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
935 (1978), although approving an instruction that lacked the balancing language. Id. at
529. But see United States v. Kehm, 799 F.2d 354, 362 (7th Cir. 1986). The court, while
noting the ongoing dissatisfaction with the language adopted by trial courts, approved an
instruction that did not include balancing language. Nevertheless, the court noted that
the facts suggested a "high probability of awareness" by the defendant of the fact in
question. Id. See also United States v. Arbizo, 833 F.2d 244 (10th Cir. 1987). The Tenth
Circuit acknowledged that the preferred form of the instruction includes balancing language, but concluded that, in the context of the entire record, failure to include the
language did not warrant reversal. Id. at 249. See also United States v. Peddle, 821 F.2d
1521, 1524 (11th Cir. 1987). In Peddle, the Eleventh Circuit approved a charge that incorporated balancing language. But see United States v. Orr, 825 F.2d 1537 (11th Cir.
1987). The court in Orr approved the following instruction:
[T]he element of knowledge may be satisfied by inferences drawn from proof that a defendant deliberately closed
his eyes to what would otherwise have been obvious to him. A
finding beyond reasonable doubt of a conscious purpose to
avoid enlightenment would permit an inference of knowledge.
Stated another way, a defendant's knowledge of a fact may be
inferred from willful blindness to the existence of the fact.
[d. at 1541.
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The current political and social preoccupation with illegal
drug importation gives renewed relevance to a conscious ignorance or Jewell instruction as a prosecutorial tool. As the Ninth
Circuit noted in United States v. Nicholson,18l absent the instruction, it would be impossible to obtain conspiracy convictions in many instances, and the "money men" financing drug
importation and distribution would escape liability simply by
electing not to know the true nature of the venture in which
they are participating. 182 For these reasons, and because the impact of the instruction is diluted by misuse, it is incumbant on
the federal Courts of Appeal to give clear and consistent guidance on form and context.
VI. CONCLUSION
Deliberate ignorance instructions are alive and well in the
federal Courts of Appeal. "See no evil" is not a maxim in which
the criminal defendant may take comfort.18S The Ninth Circuit
has provided a model that remains preeminent in its clarity and
completeness and the Jewell instruction on deliberate ignorance
remains the standard against which all others may be compared.
Nevertheless, confusion and misuse of the instruction continue
to diminish its effectiveness in criminal prosecutions.
Kristen L. Chesnut*

181. 677 F.2d 706 (9th Cir. 1982).
182. [d. at 711.
183. United States v. Hanlon, 548 F.2d 1096, 1101 (2nd Cir. 1977).
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1990.
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